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S
ince 2007, mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures
increased significantly with the deterioration in the
U.S. housing market. Among other factors, a high
unemployment rate has contributed to this landscape by
reducing borrowers’ incomes, and a persistently high rate
will continue to have negative effects. However, some recent
developments, including a sharp decline in long-term delin-
quencies, suggest that there may be an end in sight for the
foreclosure woes.
The chart shows data from the past decade: serious
delinquencies (more than 90 days), foreclosure starts (when
lenders have started foreclosure proceedings), and foreclo-
sure inventory (completed foreclosures). During the 2001
recession, the delinquency rate and foreclosure inventory
increased somewhat. In the most recent episode, from the
start of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, delinquencies
have increased fivefold, as both the number of households
entering delinquency and the average duration of that
delinquency have increased.1 Yet, the number of foreclosure
starts has become more volatile and has
actually not kept pace with the number of
seriously delinquent mortgages.
Ultimately, the national foreclosure rate
doesn’t depend solely on the borrower’s ability
to pay. Lenders’ willingness to negotiate also
affects the end result, as do their incentives
and legal obligations.
When a borrower defaults on a loan, the
lender has the choice to foreclose, but fore-
closure is a complex process that varies by
state: Borrowers must be notified of impend-
ing foreclosure, usually three to six months
after the first missed payment. And, depend-
ing on the state, foreclosure actions may be
judicial, which requires court approval, or
non-judicial, which is an administrative
matter independent of the courts.
In addition, lenders have found it difficult
to handle the recent volume of foreclosures.
Many mortgage lenders and servicers have
placed moratoria on foreclosure proceedings after defective
procedures were discovered; perhaps most visible was the
“robo-signing” scandal in which bank employees processed
thousands of foreclosure documents without evaluating
their accuracy. For a limited number of borrowers, govern-
ment programs have reduced foreclosures, although many
analysts are skeptical these programs have had a significant
effect.2
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PercentA final observation concerns the cost of foreclosure.
Contrary to popular perception, the foreclosure process
can be very costly for a lender. A number of states have
anti-deficiency laws that prevent the lender from recover-
ing the difference between the final (post-foreclosure) sale
price and the outstanding balance of the mortgage. An
alternative for the lender is to renegotiate the loan, a process
that often is less costly than outright foreclosure—by some
estimates, there is a sevenfold difference between modifica-
tion write-offs and foreclosure losses.3 Therefore, it remains
a puzzle as to why such large numbers of mortgages in
default enter into foreclosure in the first place.
Although the recent data must be viewed with caution,
fewer serious delinquencies and a slowing of foreclosures
may indicate a more beneficial balance between the needs
of borrowers and lenders. ■
1 According to Lender Processing Services, the average duration of seriously
delinquent loans has jumped from 192 days in early 2008 to 374 days as of April
2011.
2 See Gerardi, Kristopher and Li, Wenli. “Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention
Efforts.” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 2010, 95(2), pp. 1-13
and references therein.
3 However, modifications are less frequent than might be expected from their
cost savings. See White, Alan M. “Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The
Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications.” Connecticut Law
Review, 2009, 41, p. 1107.
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